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Coalition to Protect the Missouri River Impacts Analysis The Coalition to Protect the Missouri River (CPR) represents a diverse group of forty-one agricultural, navigational, utility, industrial and business-related entities all of which are, or represent, Missouri River stakeholders. CPR supports responsible management of Missouri River resources and the maintenance of congressionally authorized purposes of the river including flood control and navigation. We also support habitat restoration for endangered or threatened species. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the impacts of RDEIS alternatives on agriculture, navigation and energy and our belief that the current water control plan (CWCP) is the only feasible management option of the six proposed alternatives. Brief History Drought settled over the Upper Basin states in late 1987 and throughout
1988. It eventually spread to the Lower Basin states and lasted until
1992. Upper Basin Governors lobbied the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
to change its Missouri River management plan calling for the release of
less water, thereby keeping lake levels higher to support lake infrastructure
and recreational interests. The Corps responded with a Master Manual review
that culminated in the release of its Draft Environmental Impact Statement
and Preferred Alternative (including spring rise and split navigation
flows) in 1994. Lower Basin States voiced great opposition to the Corps
Preferred Alternative citing adverse flood control, inland drainage and
navigation consequences that were unacceptable. As a result of oral and
written testimony, the Corps reconsidered the Preferred Alternative and
went back to the drawing board. A six-month public comment period began August 31, 2001 and concluded February 28, 2002. The Corps accepted oral, written and electronic comments from stakeholders and interested parties during that time. The selection of a water control plan and the final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was scheduled for May 31, 2002 but was indefinitely delayed on June 13. The current timeline established by the Biological Opinion calls for a 30-day public comment period to follow the FEIS release. A Record of Decision was to occur in October 2002 with Master Manual changes implemented by spring of 2003. An announcement of a Preferred Alternative is not expected in the near future. In the mean time, several issues have arisen in 2002 that have adversely impacted commercial navigation on the Missouri River. In July, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) made a request to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to move endangered and threatened interior least tern and piping plover chicks and eggs to increase flows from Gavins Point Dam to augment navigation flow support downstream. Increased flows would have inundated the chicks and eggs without relocation from low lying sandbars below the dam. On July 5th, the USFWS denied the Corps request to relocate the birds (although relocation precedent has been set during flood conditions another natural event), and Missouri River levels subsequently declined bringing river commerce to a standstill. For the first time in history, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was given priority over congressionally authorized Missouri River commerce. Only one full-service boat drafting a shallow 6 _ foot remained on the river between July 3 and August 20, attempting to serve a host of terminal operators normally served by several boats. The Corps reported approximately $7 million in economic losses to commercial navigation companies and grain terminals as a result of flows declining to below minimum navigation service levels. Navigation companies have "shared the pain" of drought with Upper Basin recreation interests throughout their 2002 season. In April, navigators began their season 4000 cubic feet per second (cfs) below full service support and were reduced an additional 2000 cfs on July 1 to minimum service levels. The full service to minimum service support reduced barge carrying capacity by 200 tons per barge, increasing costs to terminal operators. In another turn of events, the 2003 Draft Annual Operating Plan for the Missouri River indicated that summer flows are projected to be at minimum navigation support (if supporting tributary inflows exist) with a 5-day shortening of the navigation season. Since the USFWS has refused to authorize the piping plover and interior least tern to be moved in drought conditions, targeted releases are not projected for 2003. This requires more water to be used as steady releases are necessary to keep the birds high on sandbars and, subsequently, causes the navigation season to be shortened under a new water management scheme. If drought conditions persist into 2003, flow support could again drop below minimum service levels. Steady releases projected at 27,000 28,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) would not provide minimum service if tributary inflows are not at sufficient levels. This would create a repeat of the summer 2002 economic catastrophe. RDEIS Alternative Features The RDEIS contains six alternatives for Master Manual changes. They are: CWCP (Current Water Control Plan), MCP (Modified Conservation Plan), and 4 GP options (Gavins Point flow management release changes). A brief description of each follows: CWCP The water control plan now in operation. MCP The Modified Conservation Plan contains river flows similar to the CWCP but includes four additional features: Drought Conservation Measures: During extended drought periods, navigation service level would be reduced earlier under the MCP plan than with the CWCP. This would allow more water to be stored in the upper lakes. During severe droughts, navigation releases would be eliminated at higher total system storage levels (reservoir storage levels). A drought comparable to the 1987 through 1992 drought would increase total system storage from 39 MAF (million acre feet) to 43 MAF. Future loss of Missouri River water to out-of-basin diversions is a logical next step with this feature. Adaptive Management: The Corps defines adaptive management as "an overall strategy for dealing with change and scientific uncertainty." They also state that this "strategy could be incorporated in any water control plan for the Mainstem Reservoir System." Fort Peck Flow Changes: These flow release changes are proposed to "trigger pallid sturgeon spawning by increasing both flow and temperature in the river reach downstream from the dam." Unbalancing the Upper Three Lakes: Unbalancing lake levels would purposely lower one of the upper three (largest) lakes approximately 3 feet every three years. It is thought the unbalancing effect will provide better species habitat. Gavins Point Dam Release Changes (GP1528, GP1521, GP2028, and GP2021) The first two numbers after GP represent the spring rise release (e.g. GP1528 represents a Gavins Point spring release of 15,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) over full-service navigation levels). The second two numbers represent the Gavins Point summer flows releases (e.g. GP1528 represents a summer flow modeled at 28,500 cfs.) These releases are an extension of the MCP alternative with its four features. Legal Issues Biological Opinion On August 20, 2001 CPR filed a 60-day Notice of Intent to Bring Citizen Suit against the FWS. The purpose of the notice was to foster discussion with the FWS about their final Biological Opinion. Unfortunately, CPR has had no meaningful discussions with the FWS or the Department of Interior. CPRs specific claims under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) are set out in substantial detail below. In summary, we assert the Secretary of Interior failed to perform a non-discretionary duty when she implicitly designated critical habitat without considering economic impacts and other relevant impacts as required by the ESA, and further, she failed to consider the best scientific and commercial data available before implicitly designating critical habitat in the Biological Opinion. The failure to consider economic impacts or other relevant impacts such as flood control or navigation violates the ESA and will impose significant burdens on members of CPR. We also assert the Secretary has acted in direct contravention of the ESA by essentially ignoring the requirement to issue "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that would avoid jeopardy and achieve species recovery. Instead, the FWS plan requires the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to restore virtually the entire Missouri River ecosystem with absolutely no consideration given to other reasonable alternatives that would protect the endangered least tern and endangered pallid sturgeon. Indeed, rather than list a true alternative, the Biological Opinion proposes a "package" of prescriptive management actions which include a requirement the Corps implement the so-called "spring rise and summer draw down" from the Gavins Point dam, restore shallow water habitat, hold back more water in upper basin reservoirs, and alter its own internal management system. In essence, the FWS has read the plural "alternatives" out of the statute thereby restraining the Corps from considering any options for species recovery other than the plan mandated by the FWS. Such a narrow interpretation is constrained not only by the ESA itself but was rejected unanimously in 2001 in a U.S. Senate Appropriations Amendment. That Amendment levels the playing field and provides the Corps with the explicit legal authority to reject the "alternative" specifically mandated by the FWS in its Biological Opinion and propose an entirely different alternative. Importantly, the U.S. House of Representatives on four different occasions has taken even more restrictive action by prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds to implement the so-called "spring rise." The Senate Appropriations Amendment unambiguously tells the Corps it "shall consider the views of other Federal agencies, non-federal agencies, and individuals to ensure other congressionally authorized purposes are maintained." In addition, the Amendment holds that the "Secretary [of the Corps] may consider and propose alternatives for achieving species recovery other than the alternatives specifically prescribed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in the biological opinion of the Service." The Amendment does not dictate an alternative, but it clearly mandates a review of additional information to ensure other congressionally authorized purposes such as flood protection and navigation are maintained and tells the Corps it may consider and propose additional alternatives. Minimally, the Corps should be required to explain why it has chosen one alternative over another and how this choice will ensure other congressionally authorized purposes are maintained. Another significant failing of the FWS Biological Opinion is many of its rigorous mandates have not undergone the important crucible of scientific review and examination. In many instances, the Biological Opinion relies on unsupported assertions or simply ignores information in its possession. Such failings rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious. The most glaring information disconnect in the FWS Biological Opinion is the oft-repeated FWS assertion that the "spring rise and summer draw down" will closely approximate the natural hydrology of the Missouri River. This FWS assertion, characterized by its goal of returning historical "form and function" to the river system, was not based on any empirical research and is flat wrong according to studies performed by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. From late May through early August, the FWS alternative would decrease in lockstep fashion the quantity of water allowed to pass through the Gavins Point dam in almost direct contradiction with historic natural flow. In short, one of the bedrock principals guiding the actions of the FWS a plan that would impose a mandatory alternative on the Corps and have draconian impacts on the flow of the Missouri River from the Gavins Point dam downstream for hundreds of miles and increase the risk of downstream flooding is based on inaccurate historic flow patterns. In another shortcoming, the FWS, while noting habitat restoration is a key factor in its plan to protect the endangered species, utterly fails to review or account for the negative consequences that will result from Corps implementation of the FWS plan. In short, if the reservoirs are raised as envisioned by the FWS alternative, this will destroy significant prime habitat of the piping plover a species it seeks to protect. Finally, the FWS selectively ignored public input. Early on, the agency indicated only it and the Corps should have any input into the process. However, while the FWS ignored the efforts of many groups to provide input, it appears that one organization, the Missouri River Basin Association, was provided access to the process at precisely the same time that others were told to stand on the sidelines. If fully substantiated, such selective input decisions are entirely inappropriate as well as arbitrary and capricious. In summary, the Coalition and its business association allies hold the Biological Opinion is legally flawed and incompatible with the intent of Congress. Agricultural Impacts and Scientific Contradictions Biological findings presented in the "Review of Missouri River Management Alternatives and Development of a Preferred Alternative" completed by the Missouri River Technical Committee (MRTC) provide scientific documentation that questions many of the FWS assumptions and recommendations. For instance, FWS demands a more "natural" hydrograph (i.e. spring rise) for the piping plover and least tern. Research completed by the MRTC term this assumption "unfounded." They report, " the timing of the spring rise and the brooding and mating season very nearly coincide The proposed USFWS spring rise once every three years during June, like the natural spring rise, will flood the sand bar habitat of the least tern and piping plover at the time they are mating and nesting Accordingly, the natural hydrograph is not the best hydrograph for the least tern and piping plover. This contradicts the USFWS basic assumption on which they have devised the flow modification scheme." MRTCs specific comments addressed in pages 9 to 31 discuss numerous assumptions and recommendations made in the Biological Opinion that are either disputed or refuted by this research. Consequently, CPR again reiterates the grave concern our members have with the scientific basis for the proposed changes in Master Manual management. Floodplain farmers till some of the most productive land in the world. They also face natural risks of flooding and inland drainage problems. Too much moisture is as detrimental to crop production as too little moisture. For this reason, there is great concern with the spring rise alternatives. Man-made river flows that will increase the risk of flooding or inland drainage problems along the Missouri or its tributaries are unacceptable. In todays difficult agricultural economy, farmers cant withstand man-made events that compound the natural risk inherently a part of farming. And, with proposals that would ultimately affect the navigation channel, flood potential increases. A "Study of Flood Control Provided by Missouri River Navigation Channel" provides an analysis of the extent of this flood potential. Overwhelming species benefits would have to occur for these risks to even merit review. Corps data indicates just the opposite will transpire. The latitude given the Corps by the adaptive management feature creates the realization that Lower Basin states must prepare for the eventuality of the highest spring rise 20,000 cubic feet per second (20 kcfs) released from Gavins Point. This increased flow is recommended to scour vegetation from sandbars to increase nesting habitat for terns and plovers and as a spawning cue for the pallid sturgeon. Corps analysis shows a net sandbar habitat gain of 164 acres throughout the mainstem reservoir system. Conversations between the Missouri Department of Natural Resources and the Corps indicate the CWCP combined with unbalancing of lakes contributes an additional 58 acres not credited to the CWCP in Corps information. This lowers the overall habitat gain to 106 acres rather than 164. In addition, only 37.4 acres will occur below Gavins Point by increasing river flows to 20,000 cfs over CWCP releases and reducing summer flows to 21,000 cfs. This minuscule gain will occur in a Missouri River watershed that drains one-sixth of the United States over an eight state area. The Environmental News Service stated on January 25, 2002 that USGS estimates in their 2001 International Piping Plover (IPP) Census show the plover population has increased "470 percent in five years and 140 percent in the decade" along the Missouri River. This increase has occurred under the current water control plan. The IPP census contradicts the December 2000 Biological Opinions plover recommendations that were based on "a substantial decline in population numbers." The Fish and Wildlife Services Biological Opinion also demands a spring rise as a spawning cue for the pallid sturgeon. The RDEIS Executive Summary states, "Corps and USFWS biologists agree that there are no data to support definition of a spawning cue that would successfully result in spawning on the Lower River."(Page 22) The Corps affirms in the RDEIS Master Manual Review that, "This lack of information supported the general understanding between the Corps and USFWS staffs that the required spawning cue is basically unknown at this point in time. Corps staff understood that the aforementioned criteria were hypothetical, and they did not have supporting data, analysis, and documentation of associated spawning success." (Page 7-61) Corps records demonstrate there is a natural spring rise on the Missouri River beginning at the mouth of the Platte River (Missouri river mile 595) and moving downstream. There is no definitive indication that pallid are naturally spawning at any greater levels where this natural spring rise occurs even though shallow water habitat is closest to ideal in this portion of the river. Corps data shows a Gavins Point release of 20 kcfs will raise river levels in St. Joseph and Omaha by 4.4 feet and in Sioux City by 5.0 feet on average once every three years. It takes 10-11 days for releases from Gavins Point to travel to St. Louis. The Corps admittedly does not have the technical capability to forecast a rain event or rain runoff. In spite of this, Lower Basin States are expected to trust that once an additional 4.4 to 5.0 feet of water is released from Gavins Point no major rain event will occur that will combine with the artificial rise to create the flood conditions or inland drainage problems envisioned. Any flood event is a significant event to those who experience it. The inadequate benefits to species improvements do not justify the far-reaching risk of these proposals. It is apparent that a cost-benefit analysis of these proposals shows the threat of financial catastrophe to agricultural interests far outweighs any species benefits. Accordingly, no logical justification exists for the increased exposure for flooding and inland drainage problems that may occur on 1.4 million acres of prime farmland. Federal agencies can not rationalize that potentially affecting approximately 30,400 residential and nonresidential buildings worth approximately $17.6 billion in rural and urban communities to create 37.4 acres of bird habitat below Gavins Point and a fish-spawning cue that may or may not help the pallid is reasonable and prudent. Only two percent of the U.S. population is farmers. Therefore, farmers must be more efficient to continue producing an affordable and plentiful food supply. Depriving farmers in the Missouri River Basin of the competitive transportation structure that includes the river, railroads and trucks will directly impact the price paid for every bushel of grain. According to The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri, prices paid to farmers for corn could be reduced 19 cents per bushel or 10 percent of the current market value if river commerce ceases. Lower prices will reflect the higher transportation costs the river terminals will be forced to pay to get the grain on to market. Missouri River Navigational Impacts Moving grain by barge is much more cost effective than by truck or rail. "According to the TVA/UT (Tennessee Valley Authority and University of Tennessee) study, rail rates in water competitive areas are lower due to historically low barge rates for grain, fertilizers and other bulk commodities in the Missouri River Basin The TVA analysis cites UT findings that "the barge alternative significantly affects rates for the movement of grain up to a distance of at least 100 miles." Water-compelled rates result when railroad routes running parallel to rivers are forced to compete with the lower-priced barge rates. There is little doubt that without river navigation, the price of transporting by rail will be even less attractive than it is currently. Simply put, savings result from water-compelled rates. Rail rates in North and South Dakota where the only options are truck or rail are much higher than where there is competition from barge transportation. This is because of a lack of transportation competition. The original mission of the Corps of Engineers, in relation to the Missouri River, was to support and promote navigation. Marian E. Ridgeway stated in The Missouri Basins Pick-Sloan Plan that, "transportation was vital to the countrys growth and the streams were the easiest and most dependable means for transporting large quantities of goods and services over great distances." Today, this statement still rings true. The Flood Control Act of 1944 provides the reservoirs function for greatest benefit to fish, wildlife and recreation, only to such degree that flood control, irrigation, water supply, power and navigation are not seriously affected. It is ironic the original mission of the Corps is the least protected in the current RDEIS and recreation and wildlife have trumped navigation. Navigation is the key river resource that bears the distinction of "most significantly impacted" by the five alternatives proposed in lieu of the CWCP. With the broad flexibility in river management created by adaptive management, we must assume the worst-case scenario will occur for both the spring rise and summer flow alternatives the GP2021 option. The RDEIS Executive Summary states flows "would be adjusted if monitoring and data analysis indicate this measure is necessary for the species." The summary goes on to state, "The GP1528 and GP2021 options represent the full range of NEPA coverage for the Gavins Point Dam release changes." This statement indicates we are not approving a specific flow option but a range of flow options. To approve any Gavins Point flows is equivalent to approving all the flows. Under this scenario the GP2021 can occur just as easily as the GP1528. From an economic perspective, this is impossible for navigation to accept. The GP1528 flow is not feasible for navigation because channel changes resulting from the 93 flood have altered them to the detriment of navigation effectiveness. What were once minimum service level flows before 93 are no longer minimum service levels today. Approximately 100 dikes destroyed by the 93 flood have never been repaired. This eliminates GP1528 as a viable flow option since flows at or below minimum navigation levels are not economically justifiable. Gavins Point summer flows below minimum navigation will cause navigation to cease altogether on the Missouri River. Navigators cannot withstand an annual reduction of 72 days or 30% of their operating season and remain economically viable. This operating season reduction would be equivalent to asking Wal-Mart to close their doors from September 14 to December 31. This contradicts congressional language requiring navigation to be maintained as a congressionally authorized purpose of the river. Mississippi River Navigational Impacts Summer flows reduced to below minimum navigation levels on the Missouri River will also negatively impact river commerce on the Mississippi River. The MCP alternative decreases flow support to the Mississippi 40 out of 100 years. Missouri Department of Natural Resources analysis indicates that 75 percent of the time or 30 out of 40 years, these cutbacks in flow coincide with low water on the Mississippi. The current water control plan decreases flow support 9 percent of the time and coincides with low water on the Mississippi about 78 percent of the time. Flow reliability contributed to the Mississippi by the Missouri is undoubtedly greater with the current water control plan than with any other. Mississippi River stakeholders have estimated the Mississippi River annual economic impacts of the MCP alternative to range from $7.5 30 million. GP2021 is often promoted as the best option for the Mississippi by conservation groups. According to Paul Werner, American Waterways Operators, "What is not said is that the cost data for one year, 1939, dramatically skews the entire 65-year average and portrays the current Missouri River operating plan as having a far more negative impact on Mississippi River navigation than modern-day experiences would indicate The Corps knows that Mississippi River navigation will be affected, just as it knows there will be periodic floods on the Missouri River. The two worst modern-day drought years on the Mississippi River were 1976 and 1988. Low summer flows as recommended in four of its six Missouri River alternatives would have increased Mississippi River navigation costs by nearly 50 percent during the drought of 1976, and by 33 percent during the drought of 1988. Meaningful decision-making information such as this is lost in multi-year averaging." Approximately 2/3 of the flow in the bottleneck reach" of the Mississippi River between Cairo, IL and St. Louis is provided by Missouri River flows in dry years. Lower summer flows advanced in the Corps proposals would not be sufficient to meet navigation needs in the bottleneck reach. Over 151 million tons of farm products, coal, sand, chemicals and other products were transported on the Upper Mississippi and Illinois River System in 1999. Any Missouri River management changes detrimental to this commercial transport artery so critical to our nations defense and economy should be avoided. Concerns about future flow changes and depletions prompted nine Mississippi River Governors to express their concerns to President Bush by letter on March 22, 2001. The State of Missouri has conveyed other concerns about depletion issues and has adamantly opposed any flow changes or reservoir level changes that would adversely impact the Mississippi River. Utility Impacts President Bushs goal of supplying reliable and affordable energy to our nations electric consumers cannot be overemphasized and, therefore, must not be overlooked or under analyzed. In fact, any recommendation that merits inclusion in the final environmental impact statement should be analyzed heavily in regard to the Presidents May 18, 2001 Executive Order 13211 that concerns regulations significantly influencing energy supply, distribution and use. Any alternative directly conflicting with the Presidents Comprehensive Energy Policy should be rejected. There is great concern among Lower Basin utilities that such a conflict may exist with alternatives other than the CWCP. Consumers receiving electricity from hydropower plants in Upper Basin states may experience an increase in electric rates if these alternatives are implemented. Energy suppliers, distributors and consumers may experience unnecessary and unjustified impacts from lower summer flows that in the end may cost millions of dollars in new infrastructure investment or rate increases. Lower Basin States have several energy generating plants using Missouri River water to cool their plants and supply energy for both rural and urban customers. Ameren, Utilicorp, and Associated Electric Cooperatives serve several million customers who are dependent on their ability to supply reliable and affordable electricity in the heat of summer or debt of winter. Lower summer flows increase the likelihood of full or partial outages. Such an occurrence during peak summer temperatures when demand is highest could jeopardize the safety of thousands and cause adverse economic consequences to thousands of businesses. In August 2001, Associated Electrics Chamois plant experienced river water temperatures that came close to restricting operations in order for them to comply with NPDES permit effluent limitations. River flows in August at the Kansas City station measured about 38,000 cubic feet per second with average August releases from Gavins Point of 25,300 to hit navigation targets. August releases were higher than what are predicted in the proposed GP2021 alternative. Had the flows been lower, Chamois could have had to go offline or reduce generation. The age and size of the Chamois plant make modifications such as cooling towers that address low water events cost prohibitive for Associated to consider. According to RDEIS testimony and utility experience, current flows that are higher than those of the GP2021 already create water temperatures extremely close to the maximum allowed before thermal discharge restrictions occur. Lower flows may exasperate a situation that is already at a threshold level. Rural Electric Cooperatives in Missouri have testified they do not support summer flows below 40,000 cfs. Lower flows may jeopardize the ability of suppliers to reliably provide an energy source for the cooling and heating requirements their customers trust them to offer and at a rate they can afford. Any options recommended for Missouri River management should not curtail or reduce the ability of energy suppliers to meet these energy needs in an economically viable way. The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) markets and delivers reliable, low cost hydroelectric power within a 15 state region of the central and western U. S. The Power Administration derives a portion of its energy production from the six dams and hydropower facilities located on the upper Missouri River. Electricity generated by these facilities is marketed to rural cooperatives, municipalities, public utility districts, irrigation districts, Native American Tribes, and Federal and State agencies. If insufficient amounts of electricity are generated within the Power Administration, energy would be purchased from other sources to meet customer demand. The amount of electricity generated by any hydropower facility is dependent upon the amount of water passing through the turbine-generators at the dam. Less water flowing through a dam creates less electricity production. Less electricity production creates the need to secure power from other sources. Since hydroelectric plants are the most economical means of producing electricity, the acquisition of power from other sources such as coal, oil, gas, or nuclear power plants will come at a cost premium. The four GP plans proposed by the Corps all have significantly lower summer flows than the CWCP. This low summer river flow comes at a time when demand for electricity is typically at its highest. Because of the high demand for energy during the summer, and the limited availability of excess power, the price of purchased power is also at its highest. The upper Great Plains Region of the Power Administration calculated revenue impacts of the CWCP and the GP options to assess the potential impact to their customers. The analysis revealed that electric rates would increase on any proposed GP plan due to reduced generation from lower summer flows and the need to purchase more expensive power from outside sources. For the GP1521 plan, WAPA estimates a 21 percent increase in purchase power cost for customers that receive 70 to 100 percent of their power from the Administration, and a 12 percent increase in purchase power cost for customers that receive 40 to 70 percent of their power from the Administration. National Research Council Comments The National Research Councils (NRC) January 9, 2002 National Academy of Science Report, "The Missouri River Ecosystem: Exploring the Prospects for Recovery" confirms the concerns that CPR and other groups have conveyed during the past 4 _ months. They recognize that relocation of people and businesses along the floodplain will have a monetary and psychological cost. Additionally, agricultural flooding and inland drainage problems will occur to reconnect the river to the floodplain. The contentious nature of the issue, however, revolves around whether the FWS recommendations will actually benefit anything or if they are even needed for certain species (i.e. piping plover). The National Academy of Science Report stated, "The most significant scientific unknowns in the Missouri River ecosystem are how the ecosystem will respond to management actions designed to improve ecological conditions."(Page 4) Problems have been identified but solutions are uncertain. NRC also states, "The Committee is keenly aware that the practice of adaptive management is a work in progress and that there is inadequate experience with successful or unsuccessful experiments to comprehensively evaluate the underlying theory."(Page 4) They conclude that science available about river ecology is not synthesized and integrated and state that until this occurs, " truly comprehensive assessments of the ecological state of the Missouri River are not possible."(Page 3) Decisions made on future management of the river must take into account the social and economic costs to all stakeholders in addition to the one-dimensional focus on conservation that has defined this process to date. Stakeholders want a balanced and common sense approach to be found in river management that addresses species needs without adversely affecting social and economic interests. Missouri River Basin Association (MRBA) MRBA voted on February 12, 2002 by a 6-2 vote to propose the Corps do a ten-year demonstration project of the GP1528 flow regime. Missouri and Iowa opposed this proposal because of the potential adverse impacts it would create for flood control and river commerce. No adverse impacts would occur for Upper Basin States with this proposal or any of the other Corps alternatives. Even under the CWCP, Upper Basin States have created an $87 million recreation industry. Lower Basin States have potential for adverse impacts with every alternative except the CWCP. A "sharing of pain" already exists during drought conditions under the current water control plan as both recreation and navigation entities suffer revenue reductions with less usable operations water. In this current season of drought in the Missouri River Basin, navigation service levels have been reduced to minimum service levels by the Corps to maintain Upper Basin reservoir recreation levels. Navigators are experiencing economic hardship as a result of these service level reductions. Summary In summary, the five alternatives other than the CWCP create the potential for the following concerns for Lower Basin citizens. First, a "man-made" spring rise has the potential to cause flooding and inland agricultural drainage problems for municipalities and farmers. Missouri River dams, initially built to reduce flooding, have prevented $24.8 billion in flood damages. Flood control management makes sound national economic and emergency management policy; Second, the higher reservoir levels included in the five new Corps alternatives reduce the water commitment to downstream states impacting future water supplies needed for irrigation, municipal drinking water, river commerce and water quality standard permitting. Each of these benefits personal life and/or a strong state and national economy; Third, summer flows reduced to "minimum" navigation levels or below will devastate congressionally authorized river commerce on the Missouri River and adversely impact Mississippi River commerce. Studies by Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri indicate the loss of Missouri River commerce could reduce the commodity corn price by 19 cents per bushel (10% of the current price paid to farmers). Annual regional economic benefits from Missouri River commerce are $75-200 million per year. Agriculture, industry and manufacturing benefit from river commerce competition; Fourth, flow reductions may also jeopardize the ability of utilities drawing Missouri River cooling water to meet the electricity needs of their customers during critical electrical demands. An affordable and reliable supply of energy benefits everyone. Water supply users may also be affected by water quality issues as discharges are made into a lower flowing river; and, Fifth, adaptive management creates too much freedom for the Corps to adjust river management, and specifically flow management, without any significant input from the public.
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